Coronavirus and Power: The Impact on International
Politics.  Egmont European Policy Brief No. 126 March 2020 by Biscop, Sven
  
 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
No. [ ] 
[Date] 
No. 126 
March 2020 
Coronavirus and Power: The Impact on International 
Politics 
Sven Biscop 
This will change everything. It is an 
understandable feeling. When people 
pass through an ordeal, they want to 
believe that when all is over there will be 
some compensation. Things may indeed 
change, but perhaps not as radically as 
may seem likely today in the midst of the 
crisis – and not all change will be for the 
better. What change could the corona 
crisis bring to international politics? 
 
 
More than anything else, this is a test of 
legitimacy for every government, though not 
necessarily for the political system as such. Does 
our government care for our health, and is it 
capable of protecting us? In the democracies, 
governments that fail to act timely and decisively, 
will most likely lose the next elections. They 
might have lost them anyway, of course, even 
without a pandemic occurring. Few people if 
anybody will question the democratic system as 
such, however. (Though one should be vigilant 
and make sure that the extraordinary measures 
now rightfully taken are not abused or unduly 
prolonged). 
 
But even authoritarian systems are more likely to 
endure than not. China’s disastrously late reaction 
caused a lot of unrest with its citizens. Such 
blatant disregard for people’s lives inevitably 
brought back bad memories of the worst excesses 
of Mao’s rule. The crisis may strengthen 
opposition to Xi Jinping within the Chinese 
Communist Party, which might have 
consequences for the succession: not everybody 
was pleased when Xi made himself leader for life 
(and his anti-corruption drive created many 
enemies too). In mid-March an anonymous open 
letter started circulating in China, pleading for a 
special session of the Party which would critically 
asses the way the crisis was addressed, and thus 
Xi’s leadership. 
 
Who knows: perhaps Xi will be forced to step 
down in 2023 anyway, after the regular two terms. 
One could then hope that his successor would 
reverse the trend towards ever more repression 
and steer a more cooperative international 
course. Or Xi will stay in power and come down 
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even harder on any dissent. Whatever happens, 
CCP rule itself seems firmly entrenched. 
 
INSTRUMENTALISING THE VIRUS 
That the regime in Beijing is nervous is clear 
enough, though, hence the massive soft power 
campaign of providing assistance to Italy and 
other countries. This is addressed to China’s 
domestic audience first of all. What better proof 
that China is on top of things than images of 
grateful Europeans, demonstrating that even 
Europe needs China’s help? The aid is, of course, 
gratefully received, regardless of the political 
agenda attached, but the Europeans themselves 
are unlikely to forget that without China’s initial 
attempt to hide the outbreak, the world might 
have limited its spread. Within the EU, at least, 
Beijing’s charm offensive will therefore not really 
change the image of China as a power whose 
assertions always have to be taken with a pinch of 
salt. That includes China’s reported numbers of 
infected and deceased people; even Prime 
Minister Li Keqiang has called on officials not to 
cover up new cases as China is winding down its 
lockdown measures.  
 
In Africa, however, the early arrival of Chinese 
aid may greatly enhance its reputation. The 
absence of the United States is all the more 
striking. By not taking the crisis seriously, Donald 
Trump lost the opportunity for the US to play any 
role in international solidarity and coordination. 
It may even cost him his re-election (in which 
case in Washington too one can hope for a more 
constructive foreign policy). 
 
The great powers in their rivalry instrumentalise 
everything, so it was only to be expected that they 
would instrumentalise the coronavirus too. 
Though perhaps not how far they would take 
this: the suggestion by the spokesman of the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry that the US army is 
somehow to blame is preposterous, and 
unworthy of China – and the Chinese 
Ambassador to the US has actually said as much. 
The same goes for similar Russian disinformation 
campaigns (alternatively blaming the US, Europe, 
and China), and for Trump pretending it was all 
just a Democrat hoax. Trump’s initial insistence 
on identifying corona as a Chinese virus was not 
helpful either. Viruses do not have a nationality; 
governments do. 
 
THE BALANCE OF POWER 
On those governments it will depend whether the 
corona crisis will change the balance between the 
great powers. This is a relative matter: the virus 
affects everybody, but will it have more impact 
on some than on others? Those who attach more 
importance to their image of omnipotence than 
to the facts, put their country at risk. The later 
one acts, the more people die, the greater the 
economic and societal disruption, and the slower 
the recovery. 
 
Vladimir Putin, instead of taking early measures, 
sent aid to Italy (in military aircraft marked “from 
Russia with love”; one assumes that Russian 
forces in Syria and Ukraine use other markings). 
As a result, Russia may be hit hard, and it has but 
limited means to spend on recovery (and low 
energy prices will limit them even further). 
Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine a change of 
political system in Russia. In any case, Russia 
already is the weakest of the great powers, so if it 
lags further behind the impact on the balance of 
power will be limited. In a positive twist, a 
weakened Russia might seek to normalise its 
relations with the European Union, in order to 
avoid having to become truly subservient to 
China. If the EU manages its own recovery 
effectively, it might actually leverage that to 
stimulate such a move, and engage Russia from a 
position of strength. But this scenario is probably 
overoptimistic. 
 
China is doing its utmost to prove that it has 
overcome the crisis. In the short term, even if it 
is first to gradually resume business as usual, a 
China that is hard hit itself cannot benefit that 
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much, though, if the European and American 
economies then grind to a halt. This will not just 
be a repeat of the 2008 financial crisis, when 
China was able to take advantage of the lack of 
investment from US and EU sources. The 
question is whether in the medium term all three 
powers recover more or less to the same extent 
and at the same pace. The US, where Trump 
belatedly awoke to the seriousness of the threat, 
is obviously at great risk. Fortunately, the US can 
mobilise massive means for recovery. 
 
So can the EU; now indeed the EU must prove 
that it can do better than after the 2008 financial 
crisis and protect the livelihood of its citizens 
rather than just the banks. After the 2016 British 
vote for Brexit, leaders of all colours finally 
discovered the need for a social Europe – and 
then forgot about it again. The EU cannot afford 
to make this mistake twice: strong Keynesian 
policies must create an economically vibrant and 
socially just Union. (How the UK will fare, on its 
own now and under a Prime Minister who 
unfortunately seems to have taken his cue from 
Trump, is another question). 
 
If one power falls behind the other two, it will 
lose global markets and influence to the benefit 
of the others. But, paradoxically, if one really 
collapses, that risks pulling down the others as 
well, so to some extent all three have an interest 
in a minimal recovery of the others (though not 
all of their leaders may see it as such). 
 
At the same time, the corona crisis will accelerate 
US and even EU action, which they were 
envisaging already, to reduce the interdependence 
with China (and others) by reviewing the supply 
chains in critical sectors. Chinese attempts to use 
the crisis to increase their presence in Europe and 
America (provided Beijing can mobilise the 
means in view of its undoubtedly underreported 
domestic problems) will be viewed with a lot 
more suspicion this time. Nevertheless, this is 
about reorganizing globalisation, not undoing it – 
at basis, deep economic interdependence will 
remain. 
 
CONCLUSION: CREATING POSITIVE CHANGE 
All in all, the balance of power may not change 
that much, nor are relations between the powers 
likely to become more cordial (unless a change of 
leadership occurs in Washington and Beijing). If 
Europeans want the corona crisis to lead to 
change for the better, they will have to actively 
create that change themselves therefore. The EU, 
in other words, will have to positively 
instrumentalise the crisis. This could be a chance 
to try and strengthen global governance in areas 
such as health, and to organise the EU’s 
interdependence with China and others on a 
more rational basis. 
The domestic front is the most important: the 
EU institutions as well as the Member States 
must abandon the fetish of the balanced budget, 
and focus on productive investment and social 
justice. European integration must return to its 
roots. The founders of the European Economic 
Community were also the founders of the welfare 
state: only the two together, they knew, could 
guarantee peace and stability. If the coronavirus 
can help Europe to rediscover this truth that all 
too many have forgotten, the crisis will not have 
been in vain. 
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